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Security and privacy are often seen as
opposite, irreconcilable goals. Privacy
partisans and security sharks cling to rigid
points of view, fighting each other in
exhausting trench warfare. As a result,
measures to increase our security seem to
scorn our privacy, while privacy-enhancing
technologies (PETs) do very little to address
legitimate security concerns. 
The concept of revocable privacy aims to
bridge the two sides of the debate to break the
status quo. Revocable privacy is a design
principle (which includes the necessary
toolbox) to build information systems that
balance the needs of both security and
privacy. The underlying objective is to design a
system that guarantees the privacy of its
users, unless a user violates a predefined
rule. In that case, (personal) information
might be released. Laws and regulations by
themselves are insufficient; they can be
changed or sidestepped later on. That is why
the principle of ‘code as code’ is taken as the
point of departure; the rules and regulations
must be hard-wired into the architecture of
the system itself. 
This article introduces the concept of
revocable privacy and shows that certain
techniques to solve this important problem
already exist. 
Security versus privacy? Trench warfare
Homeland security is a political top priority.
Whether it concerns fighting crime or
terrorism, citizens demand that their
government takes appropriate action. For
example, it is hard to argue to the general 
public why producers of child pornography
can go their way unhindered on the Internet.
To combat terrorism and to stop cyber-crime
much potentially privacy-sensitive information
is useful. But where does it stop? When
should privacy start to prevail? 
Sometimes loosely defined as the ‘right to be
let alone', privacy has many dimensions.
Technological developments, such as the
invention of the computer and the rise of the
Internet, have had profound implications on
the privacy of citizens. It is important to
realise that privacy is not only of personal
value, but also a common societal good. It is a
prerequisite for realising all of one's own
potential and for developing one's own opinion
without interference, which in turn
contributes to the development and innovation
of society as a whole. 
Unfortunately security and privacy are seen as
enemies of each other. It is thought – though
without good grounds – that one cannot be
achieved without sacrificing the other. This
tension between security and privacy is felt in
many areas of public policy-making.
Examples include camera surveillance,
systems for road-pricing, interconnecting
national and international databases for law
enforcement purposes, ID cards and their
integration into national systems for identity
management and eGovernment, and many
more. For lack of alternatives – or sometimes
for lack of understanding – more attention is
paid to the security of the system in its
development, under the (mistaken)
assumption that a focus on privacy would be
detrimental to security. Given the high
political importance attached to security
these days, this has resulted in approaches to
increase societal safety that disregard the
privacy of the citizen. Similarly, when
designing PETs, no attention is being paid to
the quite reasonable request to also consider
issues concerning the security of society. This
is a highly undesirable state of affairs, both
from a security and from a privacy point of
view. 
The need for a technical approach
The necessary mind-shift is to realise that
legal or regulatory attempts to remedy the
situation are inadequate. Rules and
regulations may change over time, allowing
for new ways to gather information about
people after the fact. Such ‘function creep’
occurs frequently; it seems that, once the
system, allows certain methods of collecting
data in principle, sooner or later politicians or
law enforcement agencies will ask for an
extension of powers. The solution, therefore,
must be found in limiting possibilities at the
outset, through technical means, in the
architecture and design of the system. 
This line of reasoning follows the idea of
‘architecture is politics’ and ‘code is code’ of
Prof. Lawrence Lessig (www.lessig.org)
among others. By embedding the rules,
procedures and regulations (‘the code of
conduct’) into the implementation (‘the code’)
of the system, they can no longer be changed
after the fact. Such a change would require a
complete redesign (and re-implementation) of
the system. To balance security and privacy
needs and achieve a reasonable trade-off we
are developing the technical concept of
revocable privacy. 
Revocable privacy
In essence, the idea of revocable privacy is to
design systems in such a way that no personal
information is collected, unless a user violates
the (pre-established) terms of service. Only in
that instance will the personal details, and
when and how the terms were violated, be
revealed. The data will only be revealed to
authorised parties, of course, and the
guarantees are technical rather than legal in
nature. We define revocable privacy as follows: 
“A system implements revocable privacy if 
the architecture of the system guarantees 
that personal data is revealed only if a 
predefined rule has been violated”. 
We distinguish two variants of revocable
privacy. 
• Spread responsibility. One or more trusted
third parties verifies whether all conditions
for releasing personal data have been met,
and grants access (or releases the data) if 
this is the case. 
• Self-enforcing architecture The rules to 
release data are hard-coded into the 
architecture. If the rules are violated, the 
data is released automatically. If no rules 
are trespassed, no information can be 
obtained at all. 
Implementing revocable privacy
Many of the techniques currently in use for
revocable privacy are based on the use of
trusted third parties. By spreading power over
many such parties (using secret sharing
techniques or similar), one can mitigate the
likelihood of corruption or subversion.
However, such systems are in essence still
based on procedure; by changing the
procedures and replacing the trusted parties,
one can still change the rules of the game. We
therefore believe that self-enforcing
approaches to revocable privacy are the way
forward. 
The idea of revocable privacy is certainly not a
new one; back in 1988 David Chaum proposed
a scheme for off-line digital cash where
double-spending a coin would reveal the
identity of the owner of the coin. To achieve
this, the protocol governing the spending of a
coin uses a so-called ‘cut-and-choose’
technique. 
Spotting canvas cutters
There are also other, more recent techniques
that appear to be promising. One example is
homomorphic cryptography, where the
encryption E(x) of x and the encryption E(y) of
y can be added to yield the encryption E(x+y) of
x+y. In other words, E(x+y) = E(x)+E(y). Using
these ideas, one can also implement
threshold encryption, where a group of N
users encrypt a value using their own private
key; in order to decrypt the value (using a
single public key), one needs at least T
different encrypted values. 
To see how threshold encryption can help
achieve revocable privacy, consider the
following real-life example. So called ‘canvas
cutters’ are criminals who roam the parking
places along highways and cut the canvas of
trucks, looking for valuable content. To
identify possible canvas cutters, one could set
up ANPR (Automatic Number Plate
Recognition) systems at the entrance of each
parking space and search the resulting data
stream for cars that enter multiple parking
spaces along the same highway on a single
day. Clearly this poses a privacy threat, as the
data of all cars visiting a parking place are
retained. One could choose to retain the data
coming from a single ANPR system for only a
couple of hours. But this is only a procedural
measure. Another option is to encrypt all
number plates recognised by each ANPR
system immediately using a threshold
encryption scheme, and only store these
encrypted number plates. Setting the
threshold at a suitable level, say 3, the
authorities only retrieve number plates of cars
that visited at least three parking spaces on a
single day along the same stretch of highway.
The advantage is that no useful information
whatsoever is stored about any of the cars
that were not registered at least three times. 
Conclusions
Revocable privacy is a method of designing
systems that could help to realise both
security and privacy requirements when
building information systems, thus bridging
the gap between security sharks and privacy
partisans. Techniques to implement revocable
privacy already exist, although they are only
applicable in specific cases. More general
techniques need to be developed and a 
co-ordinated research effort on this topic is
desirable. However, the underlying design
principles to achieve revocable privacy are
already deployable, using either general
trusted third parties techniques or special
purpose mechanisms. 
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